David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66 (1998)
What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of obviously bad commitments could be internally consistent. Nor is it necessary, since a set of obviously good commitments could be internally inconsistent. I therefore argue for an objectivist view of the grounding of commitments, taking them to be attitudes which get their rationality, or lack of it, from their responsiveness to natural human needs and well‐being. Since this view is objectivist, it avoids the problems which face subjectivism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
John McDowell (1985). Values and Secondary Qualities. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. Routledge 110-129.
Bob Hale (1986). Review: The Compleat Projectivist. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):65 - 84.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Haught (2006). Hume's Projectivist Legacy for Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 28 (1):77-96.
Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
N. M. L. Nathan (1987). Projectivist Utilitarianism: Reply to Gordon. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 26 (1):129 - 130.
David Gordon (1985). Nathan on Projectivist Utilitarianism. Erkenntnis 23 (2):201 - 202.
N. M. L. Nathan (1983). Projectivist Utilitarianism. Erkenntnis 20 (2):207 - 211.
Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist Representationalism and Color. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
Eric Katz (2011). Envisioning a De-Anthropocentrised World: Critical Comments on Anthony Weston's 'The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher'. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (1):97-101.
Karen J. Warren (2011). An Ecofeminist Philosophical Perspective of Anthony Weston's 'The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher'. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (1):103-111.
Eric Katz (2011). The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher. Environmental Ethics 33 (1):89-92.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #127,309 of 1,902,047 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #281,247 of 1,902,047 )
How can I increase my downloads?