David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press 132 (2005)
The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed back into the simulation. The internal state of the brain is just like that of a normal brain, despite the fact that it lacks a body. From the brain’s point of view, things seem very much as they seem to you and me.
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John M. Doris (2009). Skepticism About Persons. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Robert J. Howell (2015). Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
Rory Madden (2013). Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
Michael L. Anderson (2006). Cognitive Science and Epistemic Openness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):125-154.
Farid Masrour (2011). In Defense of Epistemic Modesty. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.
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