The nature of narrow content

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66 (2003)
Abstract
A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
Keywords Concept  Content  Intension  Metaphysics  Mind  Narrow  Twin Earth
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real Narrow Content. Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.
    Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
    Daniel A. Weiskopf (2009). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.

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