The Philosophical Grammar of Scientific Practice

I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice?a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ?grammar? as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ?paper-and-pencil? varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who is doing what, why, and how? More specifically, we must arrive at some coherent philosophical accounts of the following elements of scientific practice: the agent?free, embodied, and constantly in second-person interactions with other agents; the purposes and proximate aims of the agent; types of activities that the agent engages in; ontological principles necessarily presumed for the performance of particular activities; instruments and other resources that the agent pulls together for the performance of each activity. After sketching the general framework, I also give some illustrative contrasts between the more traditional descriptions of scientific practice and the kind of descriptions enabled by the proposed framework
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DOI 10.1080/02698595.2011.605244
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Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2012). Interweaving Categories: Styles, Paradigms, and Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):628-639.
Fabian Lausen (2014). Reductionism as a Research Directive. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):263-279.

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