Mind 109 (434):275-279 (2000)
|Abstract||We shall find that the metaphysical views offered on behalf of moral conclusions about abortion do nothing in defence of those conclusions. Other disputable assumptions separate each moral conclusion from the invoked metaphysical view. It is the defensibility of the other assumptions that is crucial. No metaphysical view cited on behalf of a moral conclusion substantially advances the argument in favour of the conclusion.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sarah McGrath (2007). Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 4. Oxford University Press.
Earl Conee (2000). The Moral Value in Promises. Philosophical Review 109 (3):411-422.
Earl Conee (1982). Against Moral Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 91 (1):87-97.
Earl Conee (2007). Epistemology. Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):134-135.
Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
E. Conee (1999). Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion. Mind 108 (432):619-646.
Alan Sidelle (2002). Innoculi Innocula. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):409-411.
Earl Conee (2000). Reply to Timothy Chappell. Mind 109 (434):281-283.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #114,230 of 549,754 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )
How can I increase my downloads?