David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234 (2011)
Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere assertion that p is one made by a speaker who (a) does not express his belief that p; or (b) does not believe that he believes that p; (c) does not assent to p; or (d) does not express any of these cognitive states. We show that these ..
|Keywords||Asssertion Sincerity Belief Assent Motivation Testimony|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Andreas Stokke (2014). Insincerity. Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
Similar books and articles
Richard Moran (2005). Problems of Sincerity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):341–361.
John Eriksson (2011). Straight Talk: Conceptions of Sincerity in Speech. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):213-234.
Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
Michael Ridge (2006). Sincerity and Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):487 - 510.
F. N. J. Hibberd (1985). Must an Educator Be Sincere? Journal of Moral Education 14 (3):162-169.
David Owen (2003). Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent. Topoi 22 (1):15-28.
Thomas W. Simpson (2012). Testimony and Sincerity. Ratio 25 (1):79-92.
Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
Tim Kenyon (2003). Cynical Assertion: Convention, Pragmatics, and Saying "Uncle". American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):241-248.
Edward Hinchman (2013). Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge. Noûs 47 (4):613-646.
Joel Buenting (2005). Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48.
D. H. Mellor (1978). Conscious Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (March):87-101.
Timothy Chan Guy Kahane (2011). The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
Paul Faulkner (2011). Knowledge on Trust. OUP Oxford.
Added to index2011-04-29
Total downloads88 ( #32,174 of 1,725,158 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #134,554 of 1,725,158 )
How can I increase my downloads?