|Abstract||This paper considers the relation between the value of a whole (person, society) and its parts (timeslices, individuals), arguing that the contributory value of a part cannot be determined in isolation. For example, the value of an additional life may depend on what other lives there are. This has important implications for population ethics, and especially Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion'.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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