Value Receptacles
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 49 (2):322-332 (2015)
| Abstract |
Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not
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| Keywords | Utilitarianism Separateness of Persons Value Receptacles Consequentialism | |||||||||
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| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12023 | |||||||||
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
John Rawls (2009). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Ruth Chang (2002). The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
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