David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
|Keywords||reasons, normativity, practical reason, will, source of normativity|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Attila Tanyi (2011). Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
Ruth Chang (2009). Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):133 - 160.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (2014). 'Incommensurability' and Vagueness: Is the Vagueness View Defensible? [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):141-153.
Walter Wietzke (2013). Practical Reason and the Imagination. Res Philosophica 90 (4):525-544.
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