Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity

In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
Keywords reasons, normativity, practical reason, will, source of normativity
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Ruth Chang (2009). Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):133 - 160.
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