David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 67 (4):625-647 (2000)
Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti- representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti- representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representationalism must be divided into two distinct theses, one ontological, one epistemological. Given the assumptions that define the debate, I give reason to think that the ontological thesis is false. I then argue that the epistemological thesis might, in the end, turn out to be true, despite a potentially serious difficulty. Along the way, there will be a brief detour to discuss a controversy from early twentieth century physics
|Keywords||Epistemology Model Physics Representationalism Science|
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Chemero & Michael Silberstein (2008). After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):1-27.
Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
William Bechtel (2016). Investigating Neural Representations: The Tale of Place Cells. Synthese 193 (5):1287-1321.
Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein (2008). After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):1-27.
William Bechtel (2012). Understanding Endogenously Active Mechanisms: A Scientific and Philosophical Challenge. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):233-248.
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