Bayesian test and Kuhn's paradigm

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):491-505 (2006)
Kuhn's theory of paradigm reveals a pattern of scientific progress, in which normal science alternates with scientific revolution. But Kuhn underrated too much the function of scientific test in his pattern, because he focuses all his attention on the hypothetico-deductive schema instead of Bayesian schema. This paper employs Bayesian schema to re-examine Kuhn's theory of paradigm, to uncover its logical and rational components, and to illustrate the tensional structure of logic and belief, rationality and irrationality, in the process of scientific revolution
Keywords paradigm  Bayes  scientific test  incommensurability
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DOI 10.1007/s11466-006-0021-8
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Vasso P. Kindi (1995). Kuhn'sthe Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):75 - 92.
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