Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):111-125 (1997)
|Abstract||Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and, according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But `intuition' covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to play a role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none of them, singly or in combination, can plausibly account for knowledge of abstract entities|
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