Justice: The neglected argument and the pregnant vision

Asian Philosophy 19 (2):189 – 198 (2009)
Countering the present trend in the discourse on justice wherein human reason is perceived and marginalized as an embarrassment to justice and the trend to reject the concept of formal justice, this paper argues that there is formal justice and the essence of justice is setting things right and setting righteousness to stand straight. By this token, justice means the rule of reason, not the rule of power and desire, and the ethics of justice differs fundamentally from the ethics of care/benevolence. The popular assumption that justice as the rule of reason is incompatible with the idea of justice as accommodating diversity is unjustified. The paper joins the present discourse on justice from a historical perspective. It examines the historical Confucian and neo-Confucian concept of justice in a way of its dialogues with other Western concepts of justice such as Plato's concept of justice
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DOI 10.1080/09552360902943845
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Lovett (2004). Can Justice Be Based on Consent? Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):79–101.
Yuval Livnat (2003). Benevolence and Justice. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):507-515.

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