Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357 (1993)
|Abstract||Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument is not sufficient to dispel the worry of elimination|
|Keywords||Empiricism Epistemology Folk Psychology Mental Semantics Schwartz, J|
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