Online research in philosophy

Events are center stage in several fields of psychological research. There is a long tradition in the study of event perception, event recognition, event memory, event conceptualization and segmentation. There are studies devoted to the description of events in language and to their representation in the brain. There are also metapsychological studies aimed at assessing the nature of mental events or the grounding of intentional action. Outside psychology, the notion of an event plays a prominent role in various areas of philosophy, from metaphysics to the philosophy of action and mind, as well as in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, literary theory, probability theory, artificial intelligence, physics, and—of course—history. This plethora of concerns and applications is indicative of the prima facie centrality of the notion of an event in our conceptual scheme, but it also gives rise to some important methodological questions. Can we identify a core notion that is preserved across disciplines? Does this notion, or some such notion, correspond to the pre-theoretical conception countenanced by common sense? Does it correspond to a genuine metaphysical category?

Concepts are mental representations corresponding to words. For example, the concept `dog` is a mental structure that corresponds to the word `dog' and refers to dogs in the world. Conceptual change is produced by mental processes that create and alter such mental representations. Explaining how conceptual change works is important for understanding the growth of scientific knowledge, the development of children's thinking, and the education of students in fields such as science and mathematics. In each of these kinds of learning, a theory of conceptual change is needed that can answer such questions as the following. What is the nature of the concepts that are learned? What kinds of changes do concepts undergo? What are the mental processes that produce different kinds of conceptual change? It is also interesting to inquire whether the processes of conceptual change in scientists, young children, and students are similar or different.

Suppose that one adopts a broadly Chomskyan perspective, in which there is a distinction between the language faculty and other cognitive faculties, including what Chomsky has recently called the “Conceptual-Intensional system”. Then there must in principle be at least three stages in this association that need to be understood. First, there is the nonlinguistic stage of conceptualizing a particular event.1 For example, while all of the participants in an event may be affected by the event in some way or another, human cognizers typically focus on one or the other of those changes as being particularly salient or relevant to their interests. This participant is taken to be the “theme” or “patient” of the event, perhaps in some kind of nonlinguistic conceptual representation, such as the one developed by Jackendoff (1983, 1990b). Second, this conceptual/thematic representation is associated with a linguistic representation in which the entity seen as the patient of the event is represented as (say) an NP that is the direct object of the verb that expresses what kind of an event it was. This is the interface between language and the conceptual system. Finally, there is the possibility of adjusting this representation internally to the language system, by way of movements, chain formations, Case assignment processes, or whatever other purely syntactic processes there may be. For example, the NP that represents the theme and starts out as the direct object of the verb may become the subject if there is no other subject in the linguistic representation, either because there was no agent in the conceptual representation (as with an unaccusative verb), or because it was suppressed (as with a passive verb).

This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I propose a view of concepts as complex computational structures. This account suggests that conceptual change can come in varying degrees, with the most extreme consisting of fundamental conceptual reorganizations. These degrees of conceptual change are illustrated by the development of the concept of an acid.

In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are not always abrupt. When concepts are represented by frames, the transformation from one taxonomy to another can be achieved in a piecemeal fashion not preconditioned by a crisis stage, and a new taxonomy can arise naturally out of the old frame instead of emerging separately from the existing conceptual system. This cognitive mechanism of continuous change demonstrates the constructive roles of anomaly and incommensurability in promoting the progress of science.

This paper offers a solution to a problem in Herschel studies by drawing on the dynamic frame model for concept representation offered by cognitive psychology. Applying the frame model to represent the conceptual frameworks of the particle and wave theories, this paper shows that discontinuity between the particle and wave frameworks consists mainly in the transition from a particle notion 'side' to a wave notion 'phase difference'. By illustrating intraconceptual relations within concepts, the frame representations reveal the ontological differences between these two concepts. 'Side' is an object concept built on spatial relations, but 'phase difference' is an event concept built on temporal relations. The conceptual analyses display a possible cognitive source of Herschel's misconception of polarization. Limited by his experimental works and his philosophical beliefs, Herschel comprehended polarization solely in terms of spatial relations, which prevented him from replacing the object concept 'side' with the event concept 'phase difference', and eventually resulted in his failure to understand the wave account of polarization.

Some recent approaches to narratology have presented the event as a basic constitutive element of narrativity. The event is considered either a primitive term or something that just happens or may happen, a change from one state to another. The underlying concepts are identity, state, and being. The article describes the event in general and the narrative event in particular from the perspective of the primacy of becoming, change, and flow, employing especially Whitehead’s philosophy of process and also certain concepts developed by reception aesthetics. The narrative event is analyzed in the context of the following concatenation: the event -- interconnected events -- plot -- fictional world -- the real world and its potentiality. The aim is to understand a narrative event not as an interruption of the receptive flow, but as its change of course among levels of emergence.

In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of 19th-century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability.

In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of nineteenth‐century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability.

Events are center stage in several fields of psychological research. There is a long tradition in the study of event perception, event recognition, event memory, event conceptualization and segmentation. There are studies devoted to the description of events in language and to their representation in the brain. There are also metapsychological studies aimed at assessing the nature of mental events or the grounding of intentional action. Outside psychology, the notion of an event plays a prominent role in various areas of philosophy, from metaphysics to the philosophy of action and mind, as well as in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, literary theory, probability theory, artificial intelligence, physics, and—of course—history. This plethora of concerns and applications is indicative of the prima facie centrality of the notion of an event in our conceptual scheme, but it also gives rise to some important methodological questions. Can we identify a core notion that is preserved across disciplines? Does this notion, or some such notion, correspond to the pre-theoretical conception countenanced by common sense? Does it correspond to a genuine metaphysical category?