Online research in philosophy

In the long history of moral theory, non-human animals—hereafter, just animals—have often been neglected entirely or have been relegated to some secondary status. Since its emergence in the early 19th century, utilitarianism has made a difference in that respect by focusing upon happiness or well-being (and their contraries) rather than upon the beings who suffer or enjoy. Inevitably, that has meant that human relations to and use of other animals have appeared in a different light. Some cases have seemed easy: once admit that the interests of animals matter and there can be little hesitation in condemning their cruel treatment. Among the more difficult cases has been the bearing of utilitarianism upon the use of animals in various kinds of research where, though the animals might suffer, there were believed to be prospects of great human benefit and where no cruel or malicious motives need be involved. What I shall provide in the current paper is an extended discussion of the bearing of utilitarianism upon practices of animal research. Since such practices have attracted both utilitarian criticism and defense, this will require the examination of arguments on both sides, including consideration of the human benefits, the animal costs, and the ways in which the one can be weighed against the other.

The concepts of animal, human, and rights are all part of a philosophical tradition that trades on foreclosing the animal, animality, and animals. Rather than looking to qualities or capacities that make animals the same as or different from humans, I investigate the relationship between the human and the animal. To insist, as animal rights and welfare advocates do, that our ethical obligations to animals are based on their similarities to us reinforces the type of humanism that leads to treating animals—and other people—as subordinates. But, if recent philosophies of difference are any indication, we can acknowledge difference without acknowledging our dependence on animals, or without including animals in ethical considerations. Animal ethics requires rethinking both identity and difference by focusing on relationships and responsivity. My aim is not only to suggest an animal ethics but also to show how ethics itself is transformed by considering animals.

When we take the term literally, “aesthetic education” refers to the senses. The etymological root of “aesthetic” is, aesthesis (ai[sqhsi"), the Greek word signifying “perception by the senses.” The corresponding verb is aisthanomai (aijsqanovmai), which means “to apprehend by the senses,” i.e., to see, hear, touch, etc.1 What does it mean to educate the senses? The senses, as Aristotle noted, are what we share with animals.2 The question of their education, thus, involves the notion of our “animal” nature. We see the animals about us. We note our similarities. We assert that that part of them is within us. Doing so, we draw a line between our animal and human nature. The question of aesthetic education concerns this line, both the line and its trespass. The line is between the educator and the educated, the human and the animal. The human, in educating the senses, we could say, educates the animal within it. It humanizes it. It extends its territory. The human, however, includes the animal. Could we not also see this education as the advance of the animal to the human, the extension of its territory? To answer such questions we must come to terms not just with the animal but also the human. Without this, we cannot know the role of humanistic education, understood literally as the” education of the human.” What I propose in this paper is suggest some answers to the question of the relation of the animal to the human. The claim I will be making is that aesthetic education, the education of our sensibility, is humanistic education in the etymological sense of the word, “e-ducate.” It is what first “leads or draws out” the human. It is the condition of the possibility of the being of..

Introduction: Facts and values -- Challenge and response -- Sentience, sense, and suffering -- Husbandry and welfare on the farm : assessment and assurance -- Animals for food : industrialised farming, pigs, and poultry -- Animals for food : cattle and other ruminants -- Animals for food : handling, transport, and slaughter -- Animals, science, and biotechnology -- Animals for sport -- Animals for pets -- Limping towards Eden : stepping stones.

Introduction : animals and political theory -- Animals in the history of political thought -- Utilitarianism and animals -- Liberalism and animals -- Communitarianism and animals -- Marxism and animals -- Feminism and animals.

The principle of gratuitous suffering -- The value of humans and the value of animals -- The holocaust of factory farming -- Hunting -- Animal experimentation -- The law and animals -- Women and animals.

This thought-provoking book will ask what it is to be human, what to be animal, and what are the natures of the relationships between them. This is accomplished with philosophical and ethical discussions, scientific evidence and dynamic theoretical approaches. Attitudes to Animals will also encourage us to think not only of our relationships to non-human animals, but also of those to other, human, animals. This book provides a foundation that the reader can use to make ethical choices about animals. It will challenge readers to question their current views, attitudes and perspectives on animals, nature and development of the human-animal relationship. Human perspectives on the human-animal relationships reflect what we have learned, together with spoken and unspoken attitudes and assumptions, from our families, societies, media, education and employment.

After noting why the issue of the use of animals in medical education and research needs to be addressed, this article briefly reviews the historical positions on the role of animals in society and describes in more detail the current positions in the wide spectrum of positions regarding the role of animals in society. The spectrum ranges from the extremes of the animal exploitation position to the animal liberation position with several more moderate positions in between these two extremes. Then the philosophical issue of the moral agency of animals is discussed in terms of an explication of the concept of rights and the concept of personhood. Further research is suggested concerning institutional policies regarding medical students who refuse to do physiology dog labs or other assignments which involve the suffering and/or death of animals.

It is argued that cultural attitudes of a speciesist nature are background to the current practice of animal use in teaching medical students and residents. The scope of this activity is estimated, and educational theory is enlisted to suggest that many assumptions about the effectiveness of the practice are not valid. An assessment of one course used for ob-gyn training is presented. Since it is clear that animal suffering should be avoided when possible, the case is made that alternatives to animals may be used to replace animal use in much of current medical education. Medical educators should routinely question and offer adequate justification for any use of animals in medical education.

Animals have been and will continue to be used in educational programs, but some concerns about the responsibility for assuring their proper care and humane use need to be discussed. Research animals have been regulated and monitored quite successfully by Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUC). These Committees are extending their responsibilities to cover animals used in educational programs. Three common roles of these IACUCs are described, including oversight, investigative and training responsibilities. Guidelines developed for faculty using animals at the University of Florida are presented and discussed.