David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1994)
Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties.
|Keywords||Philosophy of mind Causation Interpretation (Philosophy|
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|Buy the book||$21.95 used (63% off) $45.94 new (21% off) $49.00 direct from Amazon (16% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.C455 1994|
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Citations of this work BETA
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's Transcendental Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.
William Child (2007). Davidson on First Person Authority and Knowledge of Meaning. Noûs 41 (2):157–177.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2010). The Representational Vs. The Relational View of Visual Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):239-262.
Søren Overgaard (2011). Disjunctivism and the Urgency of Scepticism. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):5-21.
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