Converse intentional properties
Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):537-545 (1982)
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Luca Moretti (2003). Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted. Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
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Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and Content. In Luciano Floridi (ed.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
Ronald P. Endicott (1994). Constructival Plasticity. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.
Brendan J. Lalor (1997). It is What You Think: Intentional Potency and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.
David H. Sanford (1997). Chisholm on Brentano's Thesis. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a Causal Theory of Content. Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
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