Intention and Attempt

Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):37-55 (2009)
Abstract
Anglo-American criminal law traditionally demands a criminal purpose for an attempt conviction, even when the crime attempted requires only foresight or recklessness. Some legal philosophers have defended this rule by appeal to an alleged difference in the moral character or intentional structure of intended versus non-intended harms. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of any such differences; and that even if conceded, it is only on the basis of an unworkable view of criminal responsibility that such a distinction would support a rule restricting attempts to criminal purpose. I defend instead the continuity thesis, according to which attempts are functionally continuous with endangerment offenses: both are legal efforts to regulate unreasonably dangerous conduct. The upshot of the continuity thesis is that there is little substantive difference between attempt and endangerment in principle, no matter how they are labeled in law.
Keywords Attempt   Mens rea  Intention  Foresight
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    References found in this work BETA
    A. Duff (1996). Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Criminal Attempts. In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability. Oxford University Press. 19--44.
    R. A. Duff (1989). Intentions Legal and Philosophical. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9 (1):76-94.
    R. A. Duff (1995). Reckleness in Attempts (Again). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15 (2):309-325.

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    Antony Duff (2009). Legal and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):978-986.
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