Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 41 (1):33–63 (2007)
|Abstract||An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out conditions under which attitudes are rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence but not candidates for knowledge (even if true). The latter conditions will typically be “pragmatic” or “practical,” and thus license acceptance from a “practical” point of view. For Kant, only broadly-speaking practical reasons can provide adequate motivation for adopting a positive attitude towards a proposition (rather than suspending judgment) in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds.|
|Keywords||Kant Justification epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Why Justification Matters. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Gerry Hough (2008). A Dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):457–462.
Ram Neta (2007). Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2011). ‘Kant’s [Moral] Constructivism and Rational Justification’. In Pihlström & Williams Baiasu (ed.), Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Wales University Press.
Derk Pereboom (1990). Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy. Synthese 85 (1):25 - 54.
John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Richard Swinburne (2001). Epistemic Justification. Oxford University Press.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads98 ( #8,156 of 729,377 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,864 of 729,377 )
How can I increase my downloads?