David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76 (2006)
How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primary thing"? The epistemology and metaphysics of past-tense self-ascription are examined in the light of those comments, and our acquisition of the concept of past attitudes is discussed. Third, does Wittgenstein give us reason to think that the identity of a past attitude may be constituted,not by anything that was true of the subject at the time, but by her retrospective tendency to self-ascribe it? It is argued that, contrary to some interpretations, he does not
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Elizabeth Fricker (1998). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Vs. Artefact of Grammar -- A Dichotomy Rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 155--206.
P. M. S. Hacker (2000). Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Wiley-Blackwell.
Jane Heal (1994). Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach. Mind 103 (409):5-24.
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