Operationalism and ordinary language: A critique of Wittgenstein

American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):281-95 (1965)
Abstract
This paper explores some lines of argument in wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, On the one hand, And his philosophy of language, His epistemology, And his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other. The authors maintain that the later writings of wittgenstein express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism." they also maintain that there are good grounds for rejecting the philosophical theory implicit in wittgenstein's later works. In particular, They first argue that wittgenstein's position leads to some implausible conclusions concerning the nature of language and psychology; second, They maintain that the arguments wittgenstein provides are inconclusive; and third, They sketch an alternative position which they believe avoids many of the difficulties implicit in wittgenstein's philosophy
Keywords Behaviorism  Criteria  Dreaming  Language  Language Game  Meaning  Operationism  Ordinary Language  Other Minds  Scepticism  Malcolm, N  Wittgenstein
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    Robert J. Richman (1972). Plantinga, God, and (yet) Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):40 – 54.
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