Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):329-337 (2009)
|Abstract||I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mathieu Marion (2009). Radical Anti-Realism, Wittgenstein and the Length of Proofs. Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.
Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.
Steven L. Reynolds (2009). Making Up the Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):315-335.
Christian Miller (2007). The Conditions of Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:95-132.
Peter Carruthers (1985). Ruling-Out Realism. Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.
Rupert Read (2002). Is ‘What is Time?’ A Good Question to Ask? Philosophy 77 (2):193-210.
Richard Scheer (2009). Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist? Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):319-328.
William Child (2007). Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism About the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.
Harald A. Wiltsche (2012). What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism? Inquiry 55 (2):105-130.
Added to index2009-08-18
Total downloads51 ( #24,401 of 722,932 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,932 )
How can I increase my downloads?