Causation and counterfactual dependence

Erkenntnis 67 (1):1 - 16 (2007)
Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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Ned Hall (2000). Causation and the Price of Transitivity. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):198-222.

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