Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee [Book Review]

Philosophia 38 (3):579-588 (2010)
This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role for Lewis’s analysis
Keywords Dispositions  Conditional analysis  Causation  Counterfactual conditionals  Jeaho Lee  Sungho Choi  David Lewis
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9248-7
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David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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