Dispositions and mimickers

Philosophical Studies 122 (2):183 - 188 (2005)
In this paper I put forward a counterexample against Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of fragility and then refute a possible response by Lewis. And I go on to argue that Lewis can overcome the counterexample by excluding fragility-mimickers from the stimulus appropriate to the concept of fragility.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Alexander Bird (1998). Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Jonathan Schaffer (2000). Trumping Preemption. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):165-181.

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