Do categorical ascriptions entail counterfactual conditionals?

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503 (2005)
Abstract
Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his 'conditional conditionals', which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's 'conditional conditionals'
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    References found in this work BETA
    J. W. Carroll (2001). Dispositions. Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.
    C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
    J. McKitrick (2003). A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
    George Molnar (1999). Are Dispositions Reducible? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):1-17.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.

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