Do categorical ascriptions entail counterfactual conditionals?
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503 (2005)
| Abstract | Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his 'conditional conditionals', which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's 'conditional conditionals' | |||||||||
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