Dispositional properties and counterfactual conditionals

Mind 117 (468):795-841 (2008)
Abstract
For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which is generally thought to be dead, is in fact an adequate analysis of dispositions. I will go on to discuss Mumford’s view of dispositions from the perspective of the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.
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Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.

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