Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

Noûs 46 (2):289-325 (2012)
The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00789.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Mumford (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

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Citations of this work BETA
Simon Kittle (2015). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
Simon Kittle (2015). Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380.

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