Moral belief attribution: A reply to Roskies

Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638 (2006)
I here defend my earlier doubts that VM patients serve as counterexamples to motivational internalism by highlighting the difficulties of belief attribution in light of holism about the mental and by suggesting that a better understanding of the role of emotions in the self-attribution of moral belief places my earlier Davidsonian "theory of mind" argument in a clearer light.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600901954
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T. Nagel (1970). Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press.

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