David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510 (2009)
Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational.
|Keywords||Motivation Moore’s paradox Akrasia Moral judgment|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Caj Strandberg (2012). A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
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