David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):417-443 (2003)
Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories
|Keywords||belief change contraction non-monotonic inference|
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Citations of this work BETA
Emil Weydert (2012). Conditional Ranking Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):237-271.
Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (2011). AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
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