The conditional analysis of dispositions and the intrinsic dispositions thesis

The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. In this paper I will first state this idea as exactly as possible. I will then examine whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn't spell trouble for either of the two versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Along the way, I will propose an extensionally correct and practically useful criterion for identifying nomically intrinsic dispositions and criticize one objection raised by Lewis against the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00256.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Mumford (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.

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