Online research in philosophy

The Supreme Court's 2008 decision extending the constitutional right of habeas corpus to non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay is a remarkable decision on many levels. Although the Supreme Court had previously held to a mostly sovereignty based, territorial methodology for determining whether U.S. constitutional rights would be extended extraterritorially, latent in the Court's jurisprudence had long been a strain of the "personal law" principle. That personal law principle was the analytical basis for reorientation of U.S. conflicts law away from territoriality to interest analysis. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court was required to confront the competing territoriality and personal law strands of its jurisprudence. Its attempt to reconcile the two into a "functional" test mimics the same struggle that U.S. courts have had for the last four decades trying to accommodate those competing concerns on conflict of laws. Thus, this article argues that the Supreme Court's decision is best understood as a conflict-of-laws decision.

Since former President Soeharto was forced to resign in 1998, the Indonesian judiciary has been significantly reformed. A Judicial Commission was established to monitor its performance. A Constitutional Court was also created; one of its tasks is to decide disputes between state institutions and to review the constitutionality of statutes. This paper discusses the Constitutional Court case in which several Supreme Court judges alleged that the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial independence precluded the Judicial Commission from supervising the Supreme Court’s performance by critically analysing its decisions. The Constitutional Court accepted this argument, declaring that the Indonesian Constitution prohibited the Judicial Commission from performing this function. This paper discusses this case and its potential ramifications.

In response to the Supreme court’s ruling that equality was beginning to be recognized, people anti-sodomy laws are unconstitutional, like Pat Robertson pointed to the advancements evangelist Pat Robertson urged his followers to and called them evil. Twenty years from now, engage in what he called a 21- day “prayer..

The aim is to review the decisions of the Central Elections Committee and of the Supreme Court regarding disqualification of lists in Israel. Two major questions are addressed: When should tolerance have its limits?; and, What constraints on liberty should be introduced in order to safeguard democracy? The judicial analysis focuses attention on the issue of whether the justices acted in accordance with the law. Consideration is given to the written law and to existing normative considerations which allow justices an exegetic latitude. It is argued that theNeiman decision of 1984 was flawed, that the Court was erroneous in ignoring the licensing effect of its decision, and that democracy does not have to allow a violent list propounding the destruction of democracy to act in order to fulfil its aim. It is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expect democracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who either wish to bring about the physical annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy. These two cases are the only cases in which democracy has to introduce self-defensive measures and to deny representation in parliament to violent lists that convey such ideas, and that act to realize them.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007) was quickly hailed as the most important federalism ruling in 20 years. The decision has already been the subject of considerable academic commentary, but that academic commentary has been focussed, almost exclusively, on the doctrinal implications of the decision; there has been very little discussion of the underlying theory of federalism described in the decision. This paper will fill that gap. I will argue that, in Canadian Western Bank, the Supreme Court clearly outlines the theory of judicial review that has been animating its decision-making in division of powers cases, at times explicitly, but mostly implicitly, for at least the last ten years. Under this theory, the Supreme Court encourages the political branches to take the lead in defining the scope of the division of powers; the Supreme Court limits itself to facilitating an intergovernmental dialogue about the scope of the division of powers, and managing the conflict that results where the political branches fail to reach agreement.

Introduction. The trial; the right to a lawyer; double jeopardy; the electoral college; the senate; presidential pardon; judicial review; lifetime appointment; campaign finance reform; the right to political leave; the democratized corporation -- The right to a lawyer -- Abolish double jeopardy -- Empower the jury -- The electoral college -- Abolish presidential pardon -- Abolish the Senate -- Limit the power of the Supreme Court -- Abolish lifetime tenure of Supreme Court justices -- Reduce private money in election campaigns -- Expand the right to run for political office -- Expand employee rights -- The contradictions of libertarianism.

What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano has defended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed of members (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that ‘the Supreme Court’ refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find a corresponding “puzzle” in the case of ordinary singular terms like 'The Chief Supreme Court Justice'.

January 21, 2010 will go down as a dark day in the history of American democracy, and its decline. The editors of the New York Times did not exaggerate when they wrote that the Supreme Court decision that day "strikes at the heart of democracy" by having "paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate elected officials into doing their bidding" -- more explicitly, for permitting corporate managers to do so, since current laws permit them to spend shareholder money without consent.