Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 63 (1):101 - 118 (2005)
|Abstract||In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jim Stone (2009). Trumping the Causal Influence Account of Causation. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):153 - 160.
Murali Ramachandran (1997). A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Mind 106 (422):263-277.
Peter Menzies (2004). Difference-Making in Context. In J. Collins, N. Hall & L. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press.
I. Kvart (2001). Lewis's 'Causation as Influence'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):409 – 421.
Joseph A. Baltimore (2011). Lewis' Modal Realism and Absence Causation. Metaphysica 12 (2):117-124.
MIchael Strevens (2003). Against Lewis's New Theory of Causation: A Story with Three Morals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):398–412.
Peter Menzies (1989). Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #40,798 of 751,702 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,163 of 751,702 )
How can I increase my downloads?