Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden's Theory of States of Affairs
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):63-80 (2010)
Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2012). Negative States of Affairs: Reinach Versus Ingarden. Symposium. The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 16 (2):106-127.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Truth Breakers. Topoi 29 (2):153-163.
Alberto Voltolini (2002). Possible Objects and Possible States of Affairs in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In P. Frascolla (ed.), Tractatus logico-philosophicus: Sources, Themes, Perspectives. Università degli studi della Basilicata. 129-153.
Barry Smith (1978). An Essay in Formal Ontology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:39–62.
Pawel Garbacz (2009). What is an Artefact Design? Techne 13 (2):137-149.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View. Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.
Holger Leerhoff (2008). Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):249-264.
Hans Kraml (1998). States of Affairs. Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):311-324.
Wojciech Krysztofiak (2007). The Phenonenological Idealism Controversy in Light of Possible Worlds Semantics. Axiomathes 17 (1):75-97.
James D. Rissler (2006). Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):193 – 209.
Evan G. Williams (2013). Promoting Value As Such. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):392-416.
Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.
Piotr Błaszczyk (2009). ragmenty ontologii Ingardena. O miejscach niedookreślenia przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Events. Erkenntnis 20 (3):281 - 293.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads7 ( #188,016 of 1,102,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,424 of 1,102,744 )
How can I increase my downloads?