David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axiomathes 14 (4):307-340 (2004)
In this paper I will address the question of rationalizing mental causation which is involved in the processes of epistemic justification. The main problem concerning mental causation consists in the apparent incompatibility of the three following claims: (i) the subject's mental states (in particular his belief states) are realized by neural states of the subject's brain; (ii) the justifying character of belief transition consists in the fact that there are certain broadly logical relations between the contents of the relevant beliefs; and (iii) all generations of neural states are, at bottom, governed by the purely physical laws. I try to reconciliate the physical necessity of the neural states generation with the logical rationality of the belief transition. Surprisingly enough, it will turn out that, in a sense, each thinking subject is logically perfect. However, in another sense we are exactly as fallible and irrational as our common-sense tells us.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Logic Ontology Linguistics Cognitive Psychology|
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