Dutch-book arguments depragmatized: Epistemic consistency for partial believers

Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479 (1996)
Abstract The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" arguments.
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