|Abstract||It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case of pre-linguistic mental states. Further, it is noted that standard arguments for Internalism appeal to the principle that our individuation of mental states should be driven by what states are explanatory in our best cognitive science. This principle is used against the Internalist to reject the necessity of narrow individuation of mental states, even in the prelinguistic case. This is done by showing how the explanation of some phenomena requires quantiﬁcation over broadly-individuated, world-involving states; sometimes externalism is required. Although these illustrative phenomena are not mental, they are enough to show the general argumentative strategy to be incorrect: scientiﬁc explanation does not require narrowly-individuated states.|
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