David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126 (2012)
Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version of epistemic expressivism. Finally, I consider a number of objections and replies with the aim of giving the reader the tools needed to begin to evaluate the promise and prospects of epistemic expressivism.
|Keywords||meta-epistemology expressivism epistemic normativity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Eriksson (forthcoming). Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude. Erkenntnis:1-20.
Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Teemu Toppinen (2015). Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Martin Grajner (2015). Hybrid Expressivism and Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2349-2369.
Alex Barber (2013). Science's Immunity to Moral Refutation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.
Similar books and articles
Matthew Chrisman (2007). From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254.
Klemens Kappel (2011). Is Epistemic Expressivism Dialectically Incoherent? Dialectica 65 (1):49-69.
Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.
J. Adam Carter & Matthew Chrisman (2012). Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press
Matthew Chrisman (2010). From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press
Christos Kyriacou (2012). Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237.
Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford
Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Sebastian Köhler (2012). Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
Added to index2012-02-03
Total downloads101 ( #24,965 of 1,725,614 )
Recent downloads (6 months)21 ( #41,310 of 1,725,614 )
How can I increase my downloads?