David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400 (2010)
An object being non-art appears only trivially informative. Some non-art objects, however, could be saliently 'almost' art, and therefore objects for which being non-art is non-trivially informative. I call these kinds of non-art objects 'failed-art' objects—non-art objects aetiologically similar to art-objects, diverging only in virtue of some relevant failure. I take failed-art to be the right sort of thing, to result from the right sort of action, and to have the right sort of history required to be art, but to be non-art by having failure where being art requires success. I assume that for something to be art that thing must be the product of intention-directed action. I then offer an account of attempts that captures the success conditions governing the relationship between intention-directed actions and their products. From this, I claim that to be failed-art is to be the product of a failed art-attempt, i.e., to be non-art as the result of the particular way in which that art-attempt failed. An art-attempt I take to be an attempt with success conditions, that, if satisfied, entail the satisfaction of the conditions for being art—whatever those may be. To be art, then, is to be the product of a successful art-attempt. As such, any art theory incompatible with my account of failed-art is an art theory for which the notions of success and failure do not matter, and therefore an art theory for which being art needn't be substantively intention-dependent. So, any theory of art unable to accommodate my account of failed-art is _ipso facto_ false
|Keywords||Art Intentions Definition Failure Attempts Artwork|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
Kit Fine (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter. Mind 112 (446):195-234.
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2002). The Compositionality Papers. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John J. Joughin & Simon Malpas (eds.) (2003). The New Aestheticism. Manchester University Press.
Keith Lehrer (2012). Art, Self, and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
David Carr * (2004). Moral Development: A Reply to Richmond and Cummings. Journal of Moral Education 33 (2):207-210.
Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (ed.) (1976). Culture and Art: An Anthology. Humanities Press.
Christy Mag Uidhir (2012). Photographic Art: An Ontology Fit to Print. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (1):31-42.
Christy Mag Uidhir & P. D. Magnus (2011). Art Concept Pluralism. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):83-97.
Christy Mag Uidhir (2009). Why Pornography Can't Be Art. Philosophy and Literature 33 (1):pp. 193-203.
Theodore Gracyk (2011). Misappropriation of Our Musical Past. Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (3):50-66.
Added to index2009-07-26
Total downloads97 ( #41,341 of 1,796,429 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #206,825 of 1,796,429 )
How can I increase my downloads?