From epistemic contextualism to epistemic expressivism

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper, I exploit the parallel between epistemic contextualism and metaethical speaker-relativism to argue that a promising way out of two of the primary problems facing contextualism is one already explored in some detail in the ethical case – viz. expressivism. The upshot is an argument for a form of epistemic expressivism modeled on a familiar form of ethical expressivism. This provides a new nondescriptivist option for understanding the meaning of knowledge attributions, which arguably better captures the normative nature of epistemic discourse than descriptivist competitors like invariantism and contextualism.
Keywords Meaning of Knowledge Ascriptions  Epistemic Contextualism  Meta-Epistemology  Disagreement
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.

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