God, physicalism, and the totality of facts

Philosophy 82 (4):515-542 (2007)
Abstract
The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Jürgen Schröder (1997). Führt der Physikalismus Zu Absurden Konsequenzen? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (2):385-388.
    Barry M. Loewer (2001). From Physics to Physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    Nathan Stemmer (1989). Physicalism and the Argument From Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):84-91.
    Peter M. Sullivan (2000). The Totality of Facts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):175–192.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    17 ( #82,007 of 1,088,753 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,753 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.