Higher-Order Evidence

Abstract
Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
Keywords defeat  disagreement  higher-order doubts or evidence  evidence  self-doubt  rationality  rational belief  epistemic akrasia
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    References found in this work BETA
    Earl Conee (1987). Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.

    View all 17 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
    Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.

    View all 17 citations

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