David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215 (2010)
Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
|Keywords||defeat disagreement higher-order doubts or evidence evidence self-doubt rationality rational belief epistemic akrasia|
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Justified Inference. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
Andrew Rotondo (2013). Undermining, Circularity, and Disagreement. Synthese 190 (3):563-584.
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