David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370 (2008)
My primary purpose in this paper is to sketch a theory of doxastic oughts that achieves a satisfying middle ground between the extremes of rejecting epistemic deontology because one thinks beliefs are not within our direct voluntary control and rejecting doxastic involuntarism because one thinks that some doxastic oughts must be true. The key will be appreciating the obvious fact that not all true oughts require direct voluntary control. I will construct my account as an attempt to surpass other accounts (especially those due to Feldman and Kornblith) in this vein. The new idea (in a telegraphic slogan) is that doxastic oughts are what Sellars called “rules of criticism,” which are logically distinct from but also interestingly connected to “rules of action.” The distinction provides a way to understand the phrase ‘ought to believe’ which is consistent with both doxastic involuntarism and epistemic deontology; the connection provides a novel way to incorporate a believer’s epistemic community into our understanding of the scope of epistemic obligations
|Keywords||ought epistemic deontology doxastic voluntarism Alston epistemic obligations|
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Citations of this work BETA
Luis R. G. Oliveira (2015). Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Rik Peels (2014). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ From an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.
Bill Wringe (2014). The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion. Noûs 48 (1):275-297.
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