Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Oxford University Press (2004)
Abstract
What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
Keywords Belief and doubt  Logic
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Call number BC199.B4.C37 2004
ISBN(s) 0199263256   9780199263257  
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    Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.

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