Reply to Burgess and to Read

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (2):195-200 (1986)
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DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1093636611
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Patrick Allo (2007). Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.

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