Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy 75 (294):539-570 (2000)
|Abstract||It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.|
|Keywords||Experience Identity Immunity Metaphysics Self-consciousness|
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