The EPR-Experiment and free process theory

Axiomathes 14 (1-3):267-283 (2004)
As part of the creation-discovery interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein—Podolsky—Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus does not exist in space. Free Process Theory is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts' experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state does not exist in space.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Logic   Ontology   Linguistics   Cognitive Psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:AXIO.0000006796.36127.10
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,305
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

36 ( #115,431 of 1,911,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #142,835 of 1,911,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.