Testimony, memory and the limits of the a priori

Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20 (1997)
A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we are justified in believing what our senses tell us.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004268430546
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Martin Kusch & Peter Lipton (2002). Testimony: A Primer. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):209-217.

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